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"[The Copyright Act] does not intend . . . to freeze the scope of
copyrightable subject matter at the present stage of
communications technology. . . ."
New technologies can be both a bane and a blessing to
copyright owners. While technology can offer new and potentially
lucrative income streams, often for works whose markets have grown
stagnant, it can also lead to difficult legal problems. The structure
and format of some technologies do not always mesh well with the
traditional understandings of the scope and subject matter of
copyright protection under the Copyright Act. Often the problems lie
not with a particular technology itself, but with expressive works
created for those technologies. This is particularly so in the case of
works which, without authorization from the copyright owners,
completely rely on, but do not physically incorporate, protected
elements of preexisting works created by other authors. In other
1. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664
(reporting on the Copyright Act of 1976).
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words, these works intercept a signal transmitted from a tangible copy
of a preexisting work and change that signal to alter the display. 2 The
complicating factor is that the tangible copy of the preexisting work is
not actually altered in any way. Without fixation of the preexisting
work within the technology-based secondary work, the question
becomes whether the unauthorized new work is an infringement of the
derivative work right.
3
All of the works in question, which can be referred to
generically as "referencing works," involve some form of digital
reference to a preexisting copyrighted work "without making any
reproductions of any portion of [sic] the preexisting material."4 There
are a number of different forms which these referencing works can
take, with many different effects. 5 One such form is where the
referencing work automatically incorporates the preexisting work
without any prompting from the user. An example of this form is a
website with "framing" references, which is a website containing
encoded references to specific content on other websites. 6 When the
referencing website is pulled up on screen, the preexisting content is
automatically pulled up from its host as well and displayed on the
website surrounded (or "framed") by material from that referencing
site.7
Another form of referencing work requires the user to provide
an affirmative command before incorporation of the preexisting work.
8
This type of referencing work includes "add-on" software, which is
described as "any software program that augments the operation of a
computer hardware device or software program."9  These include
works that are meant to enhance the utility of preexisting works, such
as a spelling or grammar-checking program designed for a specific
word processing application. 10  Whether any of these referencing
works are derivative works so as to require the author's permission to
2. Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Digital Bowdlerizing: Removing the Naughty Bytes,
2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 167, 169.
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
4. Lydia Pallas Loren, The Changing Nature of Derivative Works in the Face of
New Technologies, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 59 (2000).
5. See id. at 67-77.
6. This is commonly referred to as "in-line linking," where there is a hyperlink
which retrieves the link to the relevant webpage and displays it. Id. at 69.
7. Id. at 67.
8. Id.
9. Emilio B. Nicolas, Note, Why the Ninth Circuit Added Too Much to Subtract
Add-on Software from the Scope of Derivative Works Under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2): A Textual
Argument, 2004 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 4, 48.
10. See Gibbons, supra note 2, at 177.
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avoi-l infringement depends on the current status of the law as
interpreted by the federal courts.
To illustrate the applicability of the derivative work right to
works that rely on, but do not physically incorporate, preexisting
works, this note will focus on the example of "jump-and-skip" DVD
filters. This type of secondary work, created by a company called
ClearPlay, consists of software that can filter objectionable content out
of commercially-purchased DVD movies by skipping scenes and
muting dialogue during playback. The filtering software caught on
quickly in highly religious communities, but soon began gaining
popularity throughout the country. Although companies like
ClearPlay met with much hostility from Hollywood studios and
directors, Congress recently declared through legislation that the
filters do not violate any rights of the copyright owner.
This note will explore the adequacy of the scope of the
derivative work right as it applies to new technologies and discuss
how that right should be expanded to compensate for technological
developments not foreseen when the current Copyright Act was
enacted in 1976. The note will also provide a recommendation that
could resolve all of the issues raised throughout. Part I provides a
more detailed background of the jump-and-skip technology being used
as an example to represent all referencing works. Part II first
discusses and analyzes the present state of the derivative work right.
It then addresses the purposes behind copyright law to explain why
the derivative work right should be expanded and offers a solution in
the form of an amendment to the Copyright Act to expand the
statutory definition of "derivative works." Finally, Part III concludes
the note with a summary of the issues.
I. TECHNOLOGY EXAMPLE: CLEARPLAY AND OTHER JUMP-AND-SKIP
TECHNOLOGIES
ClearPlay is one of a few for-profit companies offering a system
that allows home movie watchers to automatically skip or mute scenes
containing sex, violence, or objectionable language contained in DVD
movies. 1' The system, referred to as jump-and-skip technology,'
2
consists of a special DVD player equipped with the company's
technology and software that the user either downloads or orders from
11. Roger Ebert, Bowling for "Fahrenheit"- The 411, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 30, 2004,
Show sec., at 3.
12. Robert Gehrke, Senators Unite Behind DVD "Cleanup," SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb.
3, 2005, at A7; Sen. Hatch Bill Would Help Families Filter Filth, U.S. FED. NEWS, Feb. 2,
2005.
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ClearPlay's website. 13 The software contains movie-specific filters
that, when employed during playback of a commercially-purchased,
unmodified DVD movie, alter the performance of that movie on a
television screen.
14
ClearPlay's team of about ten editors develop the filtering
software by determining which scenes to skip and what language to
mute based on a variety of different factors. 15 To create a filter for a
specific movie, ClearPlay editors identify the segments of that movie
containing offensive content and record the DVD time code
information for those segments into a filter file. 16 Each segment is
marked differently based on the type and extremity of the offensive
content so that users may later determine which types of content they
wish to filter out of the movie.' 7 The ClearPlay DVD player then uses
that time code information to access the DVD movie at the appropriate
segments (or, rather, the "inappropriate" segments) and either skip or
mute the offensive content during playback.'8  Thus, the filters
developed by ClearPlay's editors contain no actual content from the
underlying DVD movies, only time code references to the content of
those movies.
Each individual movie, however, must have its own specially-
created filter in order for the jump-and-skip technology to work for
that particular title. Users of ClearPlay's jump-and-skip technology
must purchase the specific filter for each movie they wish to use with
the system. After loading a set of movie-specific filters onto the flash
memory of a DVD player, users can choose which of fourteen different
13. David Pogue, Add "Cut" and "Bleep" to a DVD's Options, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
2004, at G1.
14. Marin Decker, Film Filter Companies Hoping Bill Will Pass, DESERET
MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City), Oct. 15, 2004.
15. Brenda Sandburg, Editing Software Reignites Ire of Film Directors, ENT. L. &
FIN., June 4, 2004, at 3. The ClearPlay editors make "cuts" based on the system's "fourteen
filter settings":
(1) strong action violence, (2) gory/brutal violence, (3) disturbing images (i.e.,
macabre and bloody images), (4) sensual content, (5) crude sexual content, (6)
nudity (including art), (7) explicit sexual situations, (8) vain references to deity,
(9) crude language and humor, (10) ethnic and racial slurs, (11) cursing, (12)
strong profanity, (13) graphic vulgarity, and (14) explicit drug use.
H.R. REP. No. 108-670, at 42 n.8 (2004), 2004 WL 2045264.
16. Lance Ulanoff, I Can See ClearPlay Now, PC MAG., June 16, 2004, available at
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1759,1613310,00.asp.
17. Id. For the fourteen different types of filter settings ClearPlay uses, see supra
note 15 and accompanying text.
18. Ulanoff, supra note 16.
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content filters to apply based on their own personal preferences. 19 The
end result of ClearPlay's jump-and-skip technology in action has been
compared to "a parent putting a hand over the eyes of a child during
objectionable moments .. .. *"20 The original DVD itself is not altered
in any way, and the filtered version of the movie exists only during
playback. 21 Aesthetically, the company makes every effort to maintain
the story's continuity, 22 and on average, only a few minutes are
skipped in any given movie.
23
Thus, ClearPlay and other jump-and-skip technology
companies do not seek to provide the home movie watcher with a
different experience than that offered by the producers of the original
movie. Instead, they simply wish to offer that same experience to
people who might not otherwise partake in it due to offensive content.
However, ClearPlay editors make their editing choices without the
input or authorization of the directors who made the original movies
or the studios that own the copyrights to those movies.24 In fact, the
jump-and-skip technology companies have never even sought a license
from the copyright owners. 25 But does current copyright law even
require a license for this technology? If not, then should it?
19. Lindsie Taylor, Parental Discretion: Options for Cleaning Up Movies, TV Shows
You Find Objectionable, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City), Sept. 13, 2004; Ulanoff,
supra note 16; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
20. Gary Young, Movie-filtering Gets Legal Close-up; Suit Leads to Bill that Would
Immunize Some Movie-filter Makers, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 2, 2004, at 7.
21. Id.
22. Amanda Schurr, ClearPlay: Family-friendly Service or Blatant Meddling in
Movie Art?, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Sept. 10, 2004, at 19.
23. Ebert, supra note 11. The amount of content removed using ClearPlay filters is
generally less than would be removed when a movie is shown on television. Id. Despite
the fact that the filters are programmed to work with commercially-released DVDs, there
are no filters for any of the bonus materials, such as deleted scenes and commentaries,
which are often included with a movie. Pogue, supra note 13.
24. Young, supra note 20. Although ClearPlay justifies its filtering practices by
comparing the end result to airline and television versions of movies, those versions are
approved by the studios that own the copyrights in the movies and very often are prepared
by the directors who made the originals. Id.
25. Id. The jump-and-skip technology companies' refusal to seek permission from
movie copyright owners actually led to much-publicized litigation, which in turn led to
legislation. The litigation, styled Huntsman v. Soderbergh, began in 2002 when a company
called Clean Flicks, which was in the business of physically editing offensive content out of
store-bought movies and then reselling or renting them to a new market, and other similar
plaintiffs sued a number of Hollywood directors and studios for a declaratory judgment
that the plaintiffs' actions did not violate the U.S. Constitution, Copyright Act, or Lanham
Act. Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, 'Huntsman v. Soderbergh, 2002 WL
32153735 (D. Colo. 2002) (No. 02-M-1662). In response, the defendant studios filed a
counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment of copyright infringement against Clean
Flicks and several counterclaim defendants, including ClearPlay and other jump-and-skip
technology companies. Motion Picture Studio Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims,
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The question is whether without a license the movie-specific
filters created by jump and-skip technology companies like ClearPlay
infringe the derivative work rights of the copyright owners of the
original movies. 26 The next section of this note surveys the current
status of the derivative work right and whether the filters infringe
that right under the law as it stands. This analysis provides a greater
understanding of how the law applies generally to all works created
for new technologies that entirely depend on, but do not actually
incorporate, preexisting works.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Copyright Law Generally
Under current copyright law, protection extends to "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 27
Breaking this provision down, copyright law requires two things for a
work to benefit from copyright protection: "originality" and "fixation."
Copyright protection offers the owner of a copyrighted work a number
of exclusive rights in that work, 28 including the right "to prepare [and
Huntsman v. Soderbergh, 2002 WL 32153736 (D. Colo. 2002) (No. 02-M-1622). The
Directors Guild of America (DGA) then sought to intervene under a Lanham Act theory
that the jump-and-skip technology companies were releasing products wrongly associated
with the DGA directors. Directors Guild of America's Motion for Leave to Intervene at 3,
Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. 02-M-1622 (D. Colo. filed Aug. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.dga.orgNewFiles/pdfs/Motion%20to%2OIntervene.pdf. Attempts to settle the
litigation hit a wall in 2004, however, when the Family Movie Act was first introduced into
the House of Representatives. See Family Movie Act, H.R. 4586, 108th Cong.; H.R. REP.
No. 108-670, at 43 n. 12 (statement of Rep. Waters) (2004); Susan Crabtree, Surprise! Pols
Edit Piracy Bill, DAILY VARIETY, Sept. 9, 2004, at 2. The Family Movie Act, which after a
number of changes and setbacks during the end of the 108th Congress became a part of the
Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 (FECA), sought to amend copyright and
trademark law to protect jump-and-skip technology, along with any other technologies
allowing parents to filter unsuitable content from motion pictures, from liability. See
Family Entertainment and Copyright Act, S. 167, 109th Cong. (2005); Sarah Lai Stirland,
Intellectual Property: Movie Industry Still Hopes Anti-piracy [sic] Package Will Move, NAT'L
J.'s TECH. DAILY, Oct. 22, 2004. The litigation effectively ended on April 27, 2005, when
President Bush signed FECA and the Family Movie Act into law. Bush Signs DVD Filter
Bill, WHITE HOUSE BULL., Apr. 27, 2005. Four months after the bill was signed, the
federal judge overseeing the litigation dismissed all claims in the suit. Dave McNary,
Judge Clears ClearPlay in Filtering Case, DAILY VARIETY, Aug. 19, 2005, at 23.
26. Although jump-and-skip filters are used in this note as an example of why the
current law surrounding the derivative work right is inadequate, the analysis that follows
applies to any work that relies entirely on a specific preexisting copyrighted work for its
functionality without actually physically incorporating that preexisting work.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
28. See id. § 106.
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to authorize the preparation of] derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work. ' 29 When a person "violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner" in a work, that person has infringed the
copyright in that work.
30
As provided by the Constitution, the primary purpose of
copyright law is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."3' To accomplish this goal, copyright law grants authors a
limited monopoly in their original works, but encourages others to use
and expand upon the ideas contained in those works.32 Thus, the
private reward to the copyright owners serves only to promote the
Subject to Sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
Id.
29. Id. § 106(2).
30. Id. § 501(a). The Copyright Act provides a number of exceptions and defenses to
the general infringement rule, where a person violating one of the exclusive rights in a
work would not be liable for infringement. One such defense is "fair use," which provides a
number of factors to be considered in determining whether an unauthorized violation of the
copyright owner's exclusive rights may or may not be considered an infringement. Id. §
107. Under the Copyright Act:
In determining whether the use made of a work in a particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
Id. An exception to the infringement rule is the "first sale doctrine," which provides that
"the owner of a particular copy" of a copyrighted work may, "without the authority of the
copyright owner, . . . sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy." Id. § 109(a).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
32. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).
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creation of new works for the public benefit. 33 Absent this limited
monopoly, there would be almost no economic incentive for authors to
create and deliver new works to the public.
34
Although the copyright owner has the right to control his or her
works, this right is not absolute. For instance, an author's ownership
and control is only in the intangible expression of ideas, not in the
physical object that contains the work.3 5 As such, when an author
purposely distributes a work to the public, that distribution
extinguishes his or her right to determine how the work is to be
enjoyed. 36 These broad concepts must always be considered when
analyzing any issue arising under copyright law.
B. Current Status of the Derivative Work Right
1. Statutory Definition
The right "to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work" is one of the exclusive rights the Copyright Act
provides to the copyright owner.37 Under the Act, a derivative work is
defined as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works" in
which the form of an original work has been "recast, transformed, or
adapted."38  As the definition suggests, in order to qualify as
derivative, the work in question must incorporate some portion of a
preexisting work in any form, either through a reproduction of the
original work, the use of the actual original work, or the incorporation
of any copyrightable elements of the original work.3 9  However,
because some change to the original work is required for derivative
status, one must distinguish between an incorporation, which is
generally permanent and transforms the original work, and a method
of display, which does not alter the original work and thus is not
33. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985);
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
34. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001).
35. Id. at 1262-63.
36. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 971 (9th Cir.
1992).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000).
38. Id. § 101.
39. Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343-44 (9th
Cir. 1988).
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derivative. 40 When the preexisting work is incorporated without the
permission of the copyright owner, there may be an infringement of
the owner's derivative work rights.
41
Applying these statutory rules to works created using new
technologies often leads to unsatisfactory results. The problem is that
many works created in these media do not actually incorporate any
preexisting material until they are employed by the end user.42 Such
a situation may result in the end user being treated as an infringer
through the use of the new technology work. Thus, the only outlet for
the original copyright owner is to pursue an action against the creator
of the work as a contributory infringer. However, should the creator
of a new technology work be considered a direct infringer instead?
The answer to this question under existing copyright law is uncertain;
but before this uncertainty can be resolved, we must determine
whether other elements of copyrightability are required for
infringement of a copyright owner's derivative right.
Courts and commentators disagree as to whether a new work
that incorporates a preexisting work must be independently
copyrightable in order to infringe the original author's derivative work
right.43 These differences in opinion arise from the questionable
applicability of the fixation requirement to the derivative work
infringement analysis. Although different federal courts have
articulated many of the relevant issues that arise in this context,
these courts have been unable to agree on whether fixation is actually
necessary for infringement of an author's derivative work right.
40. See Lee v. Deck the Walls, Inc. (Lee 1), 925 F. Supp. 576, 579 (N.D. Ill. 1996),
aff'd, Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997); Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 829
F. Supp. 309, 314 (D. Alaska 1993), aff'd, 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994).
41. Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (D.
Nev. 1999). The work in question may also have to meet other standards of
copyrightability to infringe, or could be protected against an infringement claim through
the doctrines of fair use or first sale. See infra Part II.B.2.
42. For instance, in the case of products such as ClearPlay, which filters
objectionable content from DVD movies during playback, there is no dispute that
significant portions of the original movies are incorporated when the technology is applied.
However, whether the filtering companies incorporate any portion of a movie in the
preparation of that movie's individual filter is not as clear.
43. Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1218
(1997). The Ninth Circuit recognizes that a work need not be independently copyrightable
in order to infringe the derivative work right, whereas the Second Circuit requires
copyrightablility for infringement purposes. Id. at 1219.
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2. Fixation
The idea that a derivative work must be fixed in some tangible
form in order to receive copyright protection comes from the inclusion
of the word "writings" in the Copyright Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 44 It is argued that the term "writings" as used in the
Constitution would have very little meaning if it did not suggest that a
work must be in a material form to benefit from copyright protection.
45
As such, the current Copyright Act provides that "[c]opyright
protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression. ... 46 Furthermore, "[a] work is 'fixed'
in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy...
, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."4
7
There is some dispute as to whether a derivative work must be
fixed in order to infringe on the preexisting work.48 This dispute also
extends to the extent to which fixation may be required to constitute
an infringement. The argument supporting the "no fixation
requirement" position is based on both the statutory language itself,
which creates the derivative work right and defines "derivative work,"
and the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act. In laying out
the derivative work right, Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act provides
that the copyright owner has the exclusive right to "prepare derivative
works. '49 The Act's use of the term "prepare" rather than "create" is
significant, because in other contexts the Act defines "create" in terms
of fixation. 50 Thus, the use of the term "prepare" suggests that
fixation is not required for infringement of the derivative work right.51
Further, the definition of "derivative work" provided by the Act makes
no reference to either "fixation" or the "making of copies," which by
definition require fixation. 52 Instead, the statutory definition only
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see U.S. v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th
Cir. 1999).
45. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1273.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
47. Id. § 101.
48. Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright, Derivative Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage,
or Does the Form(Gen) of the Alleged Derivative Work Matter?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH L.J. 991, 1000 (2004).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
50. Id. § 101 ("A work is 'created' when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the
first time.").
51. Ochoa, supra note 48, at 1000.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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refers to either any "form in which a work may be recast, transformed,
or adapted," or an original modification.53 Finally, even the legislative
history of the current Copyright Act suggests that infringement of the
derivative work right does not require that the new work actually be
fixed.5
4
In response to these arguments against a fixation requirement,
one commentator, Professor Ochoa, suggests that Congress refrained
from including any fixation references in its treatment of derivative
works in order to ensure that the Copyright Act covers public
performances as possible derivative works, rather than intending a
general statement that fixation is not a requirement for derivative
work protection. 55  Ochoa argues that the lack of a fixation
requirement would lead to the strange result that even the
preparation of a derivative work "in one's own mind" would be enough
for infringement.56 Although in all practicality such an infringement
would never be prosecuted, the idea that such a prosecution could
occur under the "no fixation requirement" theory tends to make this
interpretation of the derivative work right questionable.5 7 However,
the problem with this argument against the "no fixation requirement"
theory is that it fails to take into account the possibility that such a
derivative work would probably be a fair use under Section 107 of the
Copyright Act.
Under this viewpoint that fixation is not required to infringe
the derivative work right, the relevant inquiry regarding the jump-
and-skip movie filters is whether they meet the basic derivative work
requirement that a new work at least incorporate some copyrightable
elements of the preexisting work. Although a set of filters for a movie
is created based on the structure and sequence of that underlying
movie, and thus has no use without the DVD containing that movie,
that set of filters is nothing more than a series of time code
instructions, void of any actual copyrightable elements from the
underlying movie. If ClearPlay or other similar companies had
designed the filters to instruct the DVD player to block scenes by
describing the content of the scene to be blocked, then there would be
a much better argument that portions of the preexisting movie are
incorporated into the filters. However, a filter designed for one movie
53. Id.
54. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 62 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675
(stating that "the preparation of a derivative work ... may be an infringement even though
nothing is ever fixed in tangible form").
55. Ochoa, supra note 48, at 1020.
56. Id. at 1001.
57. Id. at 1002.
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presumably could be used with a different movie, and the DVD player
would simply skip and mute at the same point in the time code
provided by the filter. Though the resulting movie would likely be a
mess of chopped-up scenes that no one would want to watch, the point
is that the filters are only movie-specific because each is designed to
follow the time code sequence of the particular movie. One might
argue that the timing of the movie is a copyrightable element of that
preexisting work; however, such an argument greatly stretches the
copyright requirement of originality. Thus, under this analysis, the
jump-and-skip filters probably do not infringe the copyright owners'
derivative work right.
Attempting to resolve the different viewpoints on fixation and
infringement of the derivative work right, the Ninth Circuit has twice
taken up the issue. In Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America,
Inc., Galoob manufactured a device called the Game Genie that is used
in conjunction with Nintendo's video game system to alter different
features of a Nintendo game. 58 A player inserts the Game Genie
between a game cartridge and the video game system, and then makes
up to three changes to the audiovisual display produced by the game
cartridge by entering codes provided by the Game Genie manual.59 In
order to incorporate the user's desired changes into the audiovisual
display, the Game Genie is programmed to block and replace the
appropriate information sent from the game cartridge to the system
console.60 However, the original information from the cartridge is not
altered, and the effects are temporary.6 1 Furthermore, the Game
Genie is not capable of producing Nintendo game's images without
using the game cartridge, and the information from the cartridge is
never transferred to or stored on the Game Genie device.62
Nintendo sued the manufacturer of the Game Genie under the
theory that the device's audiovisual displays violated Nintendo's
derivative work right in its copyrighted video games. 63 However, the
court held that the Game Genie did not infringe because it did not
"incorporate... the [preexisting] copyrighted work in some concrete or
permanent form."64 The court further emphasized the fact that the
58. 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992). The Game Genie device can be likened to







64. Id. at 968.
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Game Genie does not "physically incorporate" any part of the
preexisting work.65 In reaching its conclusion, the court stated that
simply comparing the audiovisual displays produced by the Game
Genie with the original displays produced by the game cartridges was
an insufficient analysis. 66 Instead, the court stressed that the most
important factor in determining whether the Game Genie creates a
derivative work is the source of the display. 67 Although the resulting
displays of the Game Genie and the game cartridge are almost the
same, the Game Genie is incapable of producing the audiovisual
display on its own. 68 In fact, the Game Genie relies on the game
cartridge to produce the displays, and has no function unless used in
conjunction with an original cartridge. 69 The court also found relevant
the fact that the Game Genie could alter the original game in an
enormous number of ways depending on which codes the player
entered into the device.
70
The strange thing about the Ninth Circuit's holding in Galoob
was the court's apparent suggestion that the "incorporat[ion] . .. in
some concrete or permanent form" standard for derivative work right
infringement is not the same as a fixation requirement. In developing
its conclusion that the Game Genie did not infringe Nintendo's
derivative work right, the court explicitly stated that fixation is
required only for a new work to be a protectable derivative work, but
not for that new work to be an infringement of another author's
derivative right.71 The court supported this contention by citing an
earlier Ninth Circuit decision which held that a derivative work need
not satisfy all requirements for copyright protection in order for it to
infringe. 72 Also, the court pointed out the difference in statutory
definitions of "copies" and "derivative work[s]": 73 the definition of
"copies" specifically mentions "fix[ation] by any method," whereas the
definition of "derivative work[s]" does not reference fixation at all. 74
In further support, the court dismissed the argument that a





70. Id. at 967.
71. Id. at 968.
72. Id. (citing Lone Ranger Television v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 722
(9th Cir. 1984); Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 209, 231 n.75 (1983)).
73. Id.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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'derivative work' is a work," and a "work is 'created' when it is fixed
in a copy or phonorecord for the first time."75 Such an argument, the
court stated, misapplies the statutory definition of "created," which
only serves to "clarif[y] the time at which a work is created."
76
Further, the court recognized that the Copyright Act does not define
the generic term "work. ' 77 Thus, the Act specifies when a work is
created, but not whether a work must actually be created first before
it can be an infringement of another work.
However, because the Act contains definitions of specific types
of works, one must look at the Act's treatment of the term "derivative
work" to determine whether it requires fixation.78 The statutory
definition of "derivative work" does not explicitly mention fixation,
79
and the "derivative work" right provides for exclusivity only in the
preparation, rather than the creation, of such a work. 0 This is the
basis for the Ninth Circuit's determination that the Copyright Act
does not require fixation for there to be an infringement of the
derivative work right.
8'
However, as previously explained, the court went on to hold
that a new work must physically incorporate the preexisting work to
infringe.8 2 As one commentator has pointed out, this conclusion is
"self-contradictory," in that a requirement of "incorporation in some
concrete or permanent form" simply sounds like another way of saying
"fixation."8 3  Further, because the court did not define the term
"physically," its use of the word has little meaning. Although the
court suggests that "physically" means the same thing as "concrete or
permanent," such a requirement cannot be universally true, as certain
types of derivative works by definition are not permanent.8 4 If the
term "physical" instead refers to something "tangible," which means
the same thing as "fixed," then there would have been no reason for
the court to distinguish between "fixation" and "incorporation in some
concrete or permanent form."8 5 Despite the apparent contradiction in




79. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
80. Id. § 106(2).
81. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 968.
82. Id. at 969.
83. Ochoa, supra note 48, at 1004.




the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that led to the "incorporation in some
concrete or permanent form" standard, for all practical purposes this
test functions the same as a fixation requirement.
8 6
The Ninth Circuit again visited the derivative work right
infringement issue in Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 87 a case very
similar to Galoob, but involving some important distinctions.
FormGen owned the rights to a computer game called Duke Nukem
3D, which contains a feature allowing players to create their own
levels for the game and post those levels on the company's website for
other players to download and use.88 The Duke Nukem game consists
of three different components: (1) the game engine, which acts as the
main control center for the game; (2) the source art library, which
contains all of the images that appear on the screen; and (3) the MAP
files, which are sets of instructions that tell the game engine where on
the screen to place the different images from the art library, resulting
in the audiovisual display for each level.89 However, the user-created
levels as posted on FormGen's website contain only the MAP files, and
users must have access to the Duke Nukem source art library in order
to create an audiovisual display.90 Thus, players must have the
original Duke Nukem game installed on their computers in order to
enjoy a user-created level.
Micro Star downloaded a large number of these levels from the
website and compiled them on a CD, which it subsequently began
selling under the name Nuke It.9 1 FormGen sued under the theory
that Micro Star infringed its derivative work right by making and
selling Nuke It, which FormGen argued created a derivative work
when run in conjunction with the original Duke Nukem game.
92
Using the "concrete or permanent form" standard from Galoob, the
Ninth Circuit held that the Nuke It MAP files did constitute an
infringing derivative work.93 The court reasoned that, unlike the
Game Genie in Galoob, where the original game cartridge rather than
the Game Genie itself defines the ultimate audiovisual display, the
Nuke It MAP files are responsible for describing the display down to
86. See Matthew S. Bethards, Can Moral Rights Be Used to Protect Immorality?
Editing Motion Pictures to Remove Objectionable Content, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 18
(2003).
87. 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
88. Id. at 1109.
89. Id. at 1110.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1109.
92. Id. at 1110.
93. Id. at 1111-12.
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the last detail. 94 In other words, whereas the Game Genie only makes
specific changes to the audiovisual display as determined by the
underlying game cartridge, the Nuke It MAP files actually determine
what the ultimate audiovisual display will look like, relying on the
underlying Duke Nukem game only for the source art. Another
distinction between the Game Genie and the MAP files noted by the
court is the level of permanence: whereas the altered displays created
by the Game Genie disappear after the player stops using the device,
the MAP files are permanently contained on a CD.95 Also, while the
Game Genie allows the player to select a set of temporary instructions
for altering the audiovisual display, the MAP files are themselves a
predetermined set of instructions.96 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that
a new work which contains exact, step-by-step instructions for
creating an audiovisual display based on a preexisting work is in a
"concrete and permanent form" for purposes of infringement of the
derivative work right.
97
Although the Ninth Circuit represents its holding in Micro Star
as consistent with the Galoob "concrete and permanent form"
standard, Micro Star can be read as a significant expansion of that
doctrine. While Galoob seems to require that some portion of the
underlying work must actually be physically incorporated into the new
work, 98 Micro Star suggests that the new work need only reference the
underlying work in some concrete and permanent way. 99 Thus, as
long as the references to the underlying work are embodied in the new
work in a "concrete and permanent form," there is infringement. 100
Under Micro Star it seems that a new work standing alone no longer
must physically and permanently incorporate actual elements of a
preexisting copyrighted work to infringe the author's derivative work
right. In essence, then, Micro Star can be read as broadening the
Galoob standard almost to the point of eliminating it, and, in the
process, requiring some fixation for infringement. However, this is
only to the extent that the new work has at least some specific
reference to the preexisting work that is responsible for defining the
final output. However, the court is unclear as to whether its holding
is limited to works like Nuke It, where the user has no choice as to
94. Id. at 1111.
95. Ochoa, supra note 48, at 1016.
96. Id. at 1017.
97. Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1111-12.
98. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am.. Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 969 (9th Cir.
1992).
99. Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1111-12.
100. Loren, supra note 4, at 73.
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which references to incorporate into the final audiovisual display, or
whether it extends to works that involve some user choice.
The jump-and-skip filters created by ClearPlay and other
similar companies have qualities similar to both the Game Genie in
Galoob and the Nuke It MAP files in Micro Star. Like the Game
Genie, which blocks information coming from a Nintendo game
cartridge in order to change the resulting audiovisual display, the
movie filters use time codes to block or mute offensive scenes and
language during playback of a DVD. 1° 1 Also like the Game Genie, the
effects of the movie filters are temporary; the filters do not alter the
movies as originally created and contained on a DVD. 10 2 When the
filters are disabled the movie will play in its entirety.
103
However, one may also analogize the filters to the Nuke It
MAP files. Where the MAP files provide detailed step-by-step
instructions for the game engine to select and place from the art
library the various elements in a level, 10 4 the jump-and-skip filters are
essentially a set of instructions that tell the DVD player which scenes
it should allow to play and which scenes to block or mute from a
DVD. 10 5 Thus, like the MAP files and unlike the Game Genie, the
filters determine what the ultimate audiovisual display will be,
referring to the original movie only to obtain the various elements
necessary to create that display.
One potentially crucial difference between the MAP files and
the filters, which is also a similarity with the Game Genie, is the
amount of user choice. While the MAP files are a permanent set of
instructions that the game player cannot change in any way, 10 6 the
users of jump-and-skip technology can choose which filters to apply
based on their own tastes and moral values, resulting in thousands of
different possible permutations. 10 7 This level of choice is similar to
that that the Game Genie allows; the user can choose from a large list
of different changes that can be made to the audiovisual display.
Whether this user choice takes the filters out of the realm of works
covered by Micro Star is unclear from the language of that decision.
Thus, because the Micro Star court did not specifically address
whether user choice might have changed its holding, there is no way of
knowing what effect it would have on determining whether the jump-
101. See supra Part I and text accompanying note 18.
102. See supra Part I and text accompanying note 21.
103. Id.
104. See supra Part II.B.2 and text accompanying note 88.
105. See supra Part I and text accompanying note 14.
106. See supra Part II.B.2 and text accompanying notes 94-95.
107. See supra Part I and text accompanying note 19.
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and-skip filters infringe the derivative work rights of the underlying
movies' copyright owners.
Another important characteristic of the jump-and-skip filters is
that a set of filters for a particular movie is incapable of independently
producing an audiovisual display.108 That set of filters must be
applied to a DVD containing the preexisting movie for the resulting
edited movie to appear on a television screen. 10 9 In Galoob, the Ninth
Circuit made much of the facts that the video game cartridge, not the
Game Genie, was responsible for determining and producing the
ultimate audiovisual display, and that the Game Genie could not
produce a display on its own. If the Game Genie had the capability to
produce a display, the outcome of that case may have been very
different. The Ninth Circuit in Micro Star, however, did not even
mention the fact that although the MAP files describe and determine
what the audiovisual display will be, they cannot produce that display
without the game engine and art library from the underlying Duke
Nukem game. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held that Nuke It was
an infringement of FormGen's derivative work right in the Duke
Nukem game.
Initially, then, it would seem that the decisions in Galoob and
Micro Star are at odds on the issue of the latter work's inability to
independently produce a display, and thus provide little guidance in
defining that issue's impact on determining infringement of the
derivative work right. However, the distinguishing characteristic
between the two cases is the nature of the resulting work. Whereas
the Game Genie does not change the progression of the storyline of the
underlying Nintendo game, the Nuke It MAP files refer to elements of
the art library of the underlying Duke Nukem game to create all new
levels of play.110 The fixed Nuke It MAP files are like a "sequel" to the
underlying game, and thus constitute an infringement of the
derivative work right."' To reconcile Galoob and Micro Star, the rule
must be that a new work's ability to independently produce a display
containing portions of the underlying work is only important for
infringement purposes if the "storyline" of that resulting display is
essentially the same as that of the underlying work. If the new work
can produce a display independently, then it infringes the derivative
work right, and if not, then it does not infringe. Alternately, if the
new work uses elements of the underlying work to create a new
108. See supra Part I.
109. See supra Part I and text accompanying note 14.
110. Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998).
111. Id.
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storyline, it infringes regardless of whether it can independently
produce the resulting display. Thus, under Galoob and Micro Star,
the former type of work requires fixation of actual portions of the
underlying work for infringement purposes, and the latter only
requires fixation of the references to that underlying work.
Under this "ability to independently produce the audiovisual
display" factor, the jump-and-skip filters are more like the Game
Genie than the MVAP files. When a set of filters is applied to a DVD
movie, the result is a slightly abridged version of that movie, not a
new storyline based on elements of that movie. Although some movies
with many moments of extreme sex or violence may lose large portions
of the storyline, even to the point where major themes and messages
are lost, the overall story remains essentially the same. Thus, this
analysis would probably support a finding that the jump-and-skip
filters created by ClearPlay and other similar companies do not
infringe the derivative work rights in the copyrighted movies to which
they are applied. Though the result under this factor would probably
be different if the filters shifted the order of scenes, changing the
progression of the storyline playback, such is not the case with any of
the jump-and-skip filters currently being produced.
Overall, because the jump-and-skip filters exhibit important
and relevant qualities of both the Game Genie and the Nuke It MAP
files, neither Galoob nor Micro Star can be assuredly and definitively
applied to determine whether those filters infringe the derivative work
rights of the underlying movie copyright owners. For example, the
fact that the filters act as a set of instructions that determines the
sequence of the audiovisual display favors the Micro Star analysis.
But the fact that the ultimate result of the application of the filters is
essentially the same story as the underlying movie supports the
Galoob analysis. Further complicating the inquiry is the choice
provided to users of the jump-and-skip technology in determining
which categories of filters to apply to a given movie. Although the
Galoob court treated user choice as a factor favoring a finding against
infringement, 112 the Micro Star court did not have to address the issue
of whether user choice would have affected the outcome. Taking all of
these factors together, the most likely result under copyright law as it
currently stands is that the jump-and-skip DVD movie filters do not
infringe the copyright owners' derivative work rights. The problem as
addressed in the next section, however, is that the policy and purposes
112. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 972 (9th Cir.
1992).
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of copyright law and the derivative work right do not necessarily
support such a conclusion.
C. Expansion of the Derivative Work Right
Though the law probably insulates jump-and-skip filters from
liability, the purposes and policy of copyright law and the derivative
work right support a broader definition of what constitutes
infringement. Therefore, the Copyright Act should be amended to
expand the derivative work right, clarifying that movie filters and
other similar types of works that rely on but do not incorporate
elements of an underlying work constitute infringing works. To reach
this conclusion, the following sections discuss the purposes and
policies surrounding the derivative work right and examine the
arguments for and against an expansion of that right.
1. Purposes and Policy of Copyright and the Derivative Work Right
The drafters of the U.S. Constitution provided for copyright
protection to authors for the primary purpose of "promot[ing] the
Progress of Science and useful Arts." 113  Thus, copyright seeks to
provide authors with an incentive to create so that the public may
benefit from those creations.11 4 As the U.S. Supreme Court has
stated, "Congress may guarantee to authors and inventors a reward in
the form of control over the sale or commercial use of copies of their
works."'115 Exactly how much of a monopoly should be provided to
authors to encourage creation is up to Congress to decide. Two
different theories support the granting of copyright protection, and,
specifically, the derivative work right: the natural rights theory and
the utilitarian theory.11 6
Supporters of the natural rights theory of copyright protection
suggest that authors are entitled to control over their works because
those authors have inherent natural rights as the creators of those
works. 117 Although Congress has never explicitly adopted this theory,
a number of commentators argue that Congress has implicitly relied
113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
114. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (2005).
115. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973), superseded by statute,
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C.).
116. Timothy Everett Nielander, The Mighty Morphin Ninja Mallard: The Standard




on natural rights in enacting much of its copyright legislation.' 18
These commentators rely on the nature and substance of much of the
legislation passed in the last two decades to support their position. 11 9
Further support for natural rights as a basis of copyright protection
comes from the idea that creative works are a form of private
property. Because the theory of private property has its origins in the
natural rights concept, and creative works are no less an individual
product of labor than private property, creative works should receive
broad protection under a natural rights theory. 120 The view that
authors have a natural right in their creative works supports broader
rights in authors to control both those creative expressions and any
transformations (i.e. derivative versions) of those expressions.
The competing view of natural rights is the utilitarian theory,
which provides that copyright protection is justified only to the extent
that it encourages authors to make their creative works available to
the public.' 2' Any more protection than is absolutely necessary to give
authors an incentive to create is considered too broad under this
theory. Unlike Congress's natural rights tendencies, the U.S.
Supreme Court has traditionally taken a utilitarian stance in its
copyright decisions. 22 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., the Court went so far as to say that "copyright law...
makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration."'123 Thus, the
utilitarian view promotes greater public access to creative works in
order to spread knowledge and encourage the creation of new
transformative works.
118. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Economics of Copyright: An Historical Perspective, 38
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 11 (1992); Nielander, supra note 116, at 8
119. Hadfield, supra note 118, at 11; Nielander, supra note 116, at 8. The following
statutes are examples of legislation enacted since the Copyright Act of 1976 which support
this contention: Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (providing copyright owners with protection against circumvention of technological
measures implemented by the copyright owner to prevent unauthorized copying); Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (extending
the term of copyright protection by twenty years); Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-650, § 602, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128-34 (providing natural/moral rights of attribution
and integrity to authors of works of visual art); Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (announcing Congress's intent to comply with the
European Berne Convention, which recognizes natural/moral rights in authors).
120. NIMMER, supra note 114, § 1.03.
121. Nielander, supra note 116, at 8.
122. Id.; cf. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991)
(emphasizing the public purpose of copyright to encourage others to build upon the ideas
conveyed by a work over the private reward to the creator); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (emphasizing the public benefit resulting from
the limited grant of an exclusive copyright).
123. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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Despite the Supreme Court's adherence to the utilitarian
theory of copyright protection, in a relatively recent decision the Court
seems to have shifted its view. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court stated
that the "secondary consideration" characterization of Sony does not
properly recognize the relationship between economic rewards to
authors and the "Progress of Science. ' 124 The Court expressed that the
nature of the relationship between private control and public benefit is
a complementary one. 125  In fact, the profit motive is actually
championed by copyright law as an incentive to aid in the proliferation
of knowledge. 126 Thus, the Court suggests that the economic need of
authors is an equally compelling justification for copyright protection
that should be balanced with the needs of the public for access and
advancement of knowledge. Whether the Court sticks with this
position regarding the relevance of profit motive is yet to be seen.
However, this seeming paradigm shift is important in assessing the
potential breadth of the derivative work right.
Although these contrasting justifications for copyright
protection generally apply, commentators have recognized additional
justifications specific to the derivative work right. Some argue that by
protecting the right to prepare derivative works, authors are
encouraged to release works into the market sooner.127 Arguably,
without that right, authors might hold back on disseminating their
works until they have prepared their own derivatives, thus
preempting any potential competitors. 128 With the derivative work
right, authors can release their works earlier without worrying that
they will have to compete with unauthorized derivatives. Another
justification for protecting an author's right to prepare derivative
works is the adverse effect that unauthorized derivatives can have on
the author's market, both as substitutes for the underlying work and
as competition for authorized derivative works. 129 Because authors
often rely on income from derivatives, allowing anyone to create their
own derivative work based on the underlying work may actually
discourage authors from creating new works. 130
The market impact factor of fair use also provides insight into
the purposes and scope of copyright protection and the derivative work
124. 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (citing U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 8).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Loren, supra note 4, at 81.
128. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 354-55 (1989).
129. Loren, supra note 4, at 76.
130. Gibbons, supra note 2, at 185.
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right.131 The essence of this factor is that authors should generally be
protected against unauthorized uses of their works that affect their
market.132 This factor considers the impact not only on the current
market of the underlying work, but also on the derivative work
market.133 Copyright law generally seeks to protect authors against
market harm by providing them with the right to control the
marketability of their works. Even when the author has not chosen to
exploit his or her work through creation or licensing of certain types of
derivatives, copyright law protects the author's right to decide when to
develop, or license others to develop, derivative works.1 34 It does not
matter whether the author ever plans to exploit a certain derivative
market. 135  Authors should not be "denied their monopoly over
derivative versions of their creative works merely because they made
the artistic decision not to saturate those markets with variations of
their original."'136 The derivative work right thus reflects copyright
law's respect for an author's right to make decisions as to whether her
works should be offered in new forms and in new markets.
This right is further supported by the contention of some courts
and commentators that the derivative work right even prohibits
unauthorized uses that have a positive impact on the value of a
preexisting work. 37  For example, one commentator offers the
131. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) ("In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include .. .the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."). Although "fair use"
is a statutory and common law defense to copyright infringement claims and only comes
into play when a particular unauthorized use would otherwise be considered actual
copyright infringement, established analysis regarding the market impact factor provides
important policy justifications for determining when preexisting works should be protected
against unauthorized uses. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
In a fair use analysis courts must assess whether a particular unauthorized user should be
liable to the author of the underlying work. The inquiry is essentially how broad copyright
protection should be and when it should give way to public interests, which is what this
article attempts to determine in the context of the derivative work right. Id.
132. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984);
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1532 (9th Cir. 1992).
133. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nations Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985).
134. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145-46 (2d
Cir. 1998).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 146.
137. See, e.g., id. at 145-46 (noting that an infringing Seinfeld trivia book was not
critical of the show but rather paid homage to it); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l,
Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that, even though the infringing work
arguably provided helpful publicity for the underlying work, it still competed in the
markets in which the holder of the copyright had a legitimate interest); UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding unpersuasive the
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hypothetical of a well-known disc jockey who uses an obscure
recording as the theme song for a radio program without obtaining
permission from the owner. 138 Although the market for the previously
unknown song would surely benefit from this exposure, there is little
question that the disc jockey's use is an infringement. 139 One reason
for this position is that, although the market for the preexisting work
may increase, an unauthorized derivative use can cut into any actual
or potential markets for author-approved derivative works.' 40 Even
when the author of a preexisting work has not or will not pursue
exploitation of that work in a particular new form or new market, the
author retains the right prevent others from doing so in her stead.
141
Authors may have compelling reasons for deciding not to develop
certain derivative markets, or for doing so only on limited terms, and
copyright law does not seek to override these concerns. 142 Thus, when
a new user benefits directly from the unauthorized use of another's
work, the fact that the prior author also benefits financially should
have no impact on that author's right to control the exploitation of her
works. 143
Further suggesting the potential scope of the derivative work
right are court decisions dealing with the balance between the market
effect of an unauthorized use and the nature and purpose of that
use.' 44 Although not always apparent on the surface, some secondary
uses of a work add creative expression to the point of transforming the
defendant's argument that his work enhances the plaintiff copyright holder's sales); Pierre
N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1459 (1997) (noting
that extensive quoting by another publication of a work may increase the value of a work
and still be a clear infringement of copyright).
138. See Leval, supra note 137, at 1459.
139. Id.
140. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 1998); UMG, 92 F.
Supp. 2d at 352.
141. Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145-46; UMG, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
142. Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145-46; UMG, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
143. This concept is represented in certain types of secondary works that are already
recognized as derivative works under the Copyright Act. For instance, a traditional
derivative work like a film adaptation of a novel would not be a market substitute for the
original, and might even lead to increased sales of the novel, yet it still requires permission
from the copyright owner.
144. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994)
(distinguishing between the effect of parody and infringement of a product's marketability);
Video Pipeline v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, 342 F.3d 191, 200 (3d Cir. 2003) (analyzing
the commercial nature of the infringing work and the possibility that the work will be
substituted for that which was copyrighted) ; Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting the close relationship between the inquiry into the
purpose of the "purpose and character" inquiry and the inquiry into the effect on the
potential market for the copyrighted work).
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original work, whereas others do nothing more than exploit the
original author's creative efforts. 145 Although the latter is certainly
considered an infringement of the underlying work, copyright law is
not clear as to whether an unauthorized use in the former category
should be protected against claims of infringement of the derivative
work right. 146 The trouble is determining when an element added by a
secondary user is sufficiently creative to take the underlying work to a
new level or whether it is simply exploitative. Courts attempt to
compare the works to determine whether the alleged infringer
actually adds something fresh, or only seeks to avoid being creative
and to turn a profit off of someone else's work.
147
In summary, the goal of copyright law and the derivative work
right is to balance the interests of authors in controlling their
creations with the interests of the public in advancing knowledge
through the dissemination of original works and derivatives. Two
viewpoints have emerged regarding the extent of authorial control.
Courts traditionally have followed the utilitarian theory, which states
that authors should have control over and profit from their works only
to the extent necessary to provide them with an incentive to create.
However, the natural rights theory, which provides that authors as
creators have the inherent right to control their works, seems to have
influenced Congress and even some recent court decisions . Various
market-related considerations also support the view that authors
should be entitled to broad protection against unauthorized derivative
uses of their works. With this trend towards recognizing authors'
interests in broad derivative work right protection, the question that
naturally follows is just how broad that protection should extend.
This note has already determined that the law as it currently stands
probably does not provide protection against works such as the jump-
and-skip filters which rely entirely on another copyrighted work
without physically incorporating that preexisting work.1 48 But should
it? The following section explores the arguments for and against an
expansion of the derivative work right to cover such works.
2. Should the Derivative Work Right Be Expanded?
In a broad sense, the primary concern regarding the expansion
of the derivative work right standard to cover works that rely on, but
145. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
146. Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 198.
147. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580; Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 2000.
148. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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do not physically incorporate, preexisting works is whether such an
expansion would comport with the purposes of copyright law. As
addressed in the previous section, there is a tension between the
rights of authors to control the exploitation of their works and the
public interest in access to a marketplace of diverse ideas. Those who
argue for strict limitations on which secondary uses will actually be
considered derivative take a utilitarian approach and focus on the
proposition that broad authorial control inhibits creativity and
technological developments. 149 In other words, they suggest that a
broad derivative work right does not "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts. ' 150 This note takes the contrary natural rights view
that recognizing broad control in authors over derivative uses of their
works encourages transactions between copyright owners and the
developers of secondary works. This approach relies on the idea that
authors will bargain with these creators, and that the marketplace
will naturally produce authorized secondary works to provide content
for technological innovations and thus promote the flow of ideas.1
51
The most common argument against an expansion of the
derivative work right is that such an increase in authorial control will
stifle creativity.152 In the context of new technologies that employ
secondary works, the fear is that copyright owners will have the power
to kill off innovations and so-called improvements to existing works
and technologies. 153 Supporters of this position contend that all a
copyright owner would have to do is refuse to license a work for the
intended secondary development, and the particular "improvement"
would be foreclosed, no matter how innovative or how much public
value would be added to the preexisting work. For instance, if
creators of jump-and-skip DVD filters were required to seek licenses
for every copyrighted movie for which they wished to create a filter,
and if most copyright owners refused the license, then the DVD-
skipping technology would be useless and the public interest
presumably would suffer. Proponents of this theory argue that
unauthorized secondary uses should be permissible, especially if the
copyright owner is not offering its own version of the improvement
and thus not meeting public demand for such improvements to
149. See Loren, supra note 4, at 61; Nicolas, supra note 9, at 69.
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
151. This approach has no effect on a secondary user's ability to invoke the fair use
defense to copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
152.See Loren, supra note 4, at 61; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (stating that
"rigid application of the copyright statute ... would stifle the very creativity which the law
is designed to foster").
153. Nicolas, supra note 9, at 69.
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preexisting works.154 Even stronger cases are those in which the new
features actually enhance the function of and increase demand for the
preexisting works.
155
The problem with this "stifling creativity" argument is that
there is no reason to believe that most authors of preexisting works
would refuse to bargain in the marketplace for the creation of
secondary works by others. 156 Although there certainly are instances
in which authors do refuse to grant licenses, many times this is due to
the author's belief that the requested use would only devalue the
original, without adding any socially-beneficial content. Generally,
authors are enthusiastic about exploiting their works for economic
gain, particularly in new markets. Further, the fact that an author of
a preexisting work is not currently providing society with a particular
"improvement" does not necessarily mean that the author has
consciously chosen to deprive the market of such secondary works.
The author may not be aware that a market for certain secondary uses
even exists, or a market may not actually exist until after those uses
are developed and released to the public. A secondary creator should
not be free to openly exploit the work of another simply because the
author of the preexisting work did not have the insight or foresight to
recognize or predict public demand. Thus, those interested in creating
secondary works that rely entirely on preexisting works for their
functionality should make some attempt to bargain with the author.
Further, the possible transaction costs associated with
bargaining do not support limiting the derivative work right of
authors. Those opposed to a broad derivative work right might
suggest that even with authors of preexisting works who wish to
154. See id.
155. See Edward G. Black & Michael H. Page, Add-On Infringements: When
Computer Add-Ons and Peripherals Should (and Should Not) Be Considered Infringing
Derivative Works Under Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., and Other
Recent Decisions, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 615, 635 (1993) (discussing creators of
unauthorized computer add-ons to existing programs, which the authors argue do not sell
the preexisting work in a new market, but instead actually provide new products for the
market).
156. Some authors actually encourage others to develop secondary works as a way of
enhancing the market for the original works. This is particularly true in the case of add-
ons for computer software. For example, Apple Computers, Inc., maintained the
philosophy that add-ons created by others were crucial to its products being successful.
Black & Page, supra note 155, at 618. Even authors that do not see secondary uses by
others as being particularly advantageous generally are still willing to license those uses
for a fee. For instance, video game creators such as Nintendo of America, Inc., and Sega of
America, Inc., have pursued aggressive litigation strategies for unauthorized users in the
past (such as in the Galoob case discussed earlier), but still issue licenses to those who seek
permission. Id. at 618-19.
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bargain, the transaction costs associated with such bargaining may
discourage potential secondary users. Such an argument gives the
impression that the original author is only self-interested, while the
requesting user has society's interests in mind. Usually, however, the
hopeful secondary user also seeks to make a profit, and is not solely in
business for the benefit of society. Thus, by potentially increasing
costs and limiting possible profits, a broad derivative work right could
be viewed as a disincentive to secondary users. However, a weaker
derivative work right may have an equal effect on the original author.
Authors often consider potential income from derivative uses of their
works when deciding to create. 157 A weaker derivative work right
would allow more unauthorized uses, thus decreasing the author's
incentive to create. In other words, even if the prospect of derivative
versions of an author's work were not an incentive, allowing others to
create derivative works without the author's permission might be a
disincentive for the author to create. 158
The question, then, is whose incentive is more important, the
original author's or the potential secondary user's? Because an
expansion of the derivative work right would not prevent an
unauthorized secondary user from asserting a fair use defense to an
infringement claim, such users would maintain an incentive to create
even when market transactions fail. With incentives available for
both original authors and secondary users to create, an expansion of
the derivative work right to include works that rely on but do not
physically incorporate preexisting works is consistent with copyright's
purpose of balancing the interests of authors and society.
Although changing the derivative work right to protect
copyrighted works from being used in such ways might be an
expansion of the derivative work right from its historical background,
copyright protection should adapt to changing technology. Those
opposing an expansion of the derivative work right argue that many
types of works covered by such an expansion are not analogous to
historically recognized derivative works. 159  Therefore, authors of
preexisting works would not and should not consider the potential to
exploit their works in these new formats as an incentive to create in
157. Goldstein, supra note 72, at 227.
158. For instance, an author of a novel might not write that novel with thoughts of
later adapting it into a film, but if a third party could lawfully make such an adaptation
without the author's permission and without providing compensation, the author may be
disinclined to write again in the future. If a secondary user can legally profit from an
author's creation without paying for the right to use it, why would the author even want to
exert the time and effort to create new and interesting stories?
159. See Loren, supra note 4, at 80-81.
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the first place. 160 Instead, the derivative work right should cover only
those works from which a copyright owner expects to profit, which
would not include potential types of works of which the author is not
aware. 161 However, this argument is weak because its approach would
effectively freeze the derivative work right in the past. Relying only
on historically recognized uses is extremely narrow-sighted, and
allows for little or no development of the derivative work doctrine as
technology develops and new forms of expression and exploitation
emerge. Copyright owners should not have to see into the future and
predict such developments in order to be protected from them.
Although history should not be used to bind the derivative
work right to a stagnant form, it can be considered to support an
expansion of that right. As a number of commentators have pointed
out, throughout the development of copyright law, the derivative work
right has been expanded to protect copyright owners against potential
future uses of preexisting works in new and anticipated technology
and media. 162 Further, as already discussed in the context of the
purposes of copyright protection, Congress has effectively followed a
natural rights approach in expanding copyright law. 163  Despite
interpretations by courts that might suggest otherwise, the legislative
history of the current Copyright Act supports an expansive view of the
derivative work right.1 64 For instance, in passing the Copyright Act,
Congress expressed that copyright law should be flexible enough to
adapt to new technologies.1 65 Also, the legislative history recognizes
that certain types of works should still be considered derivative,
despite the fact that they are never fixed in a tangible form.1 66 Thus,
history shows that Congress would likely be receptive to expanding
the derivative work to cover works that rely on but do not incorporate
preexisting copyrighted works.
Finally, the equitable concept-that profiting off of the
exploitation of another's creative expression without authorization is
just wrong, no matter whether the secondary uses contain
independent originality or incorporate the prior work through
fixation-supports an expansion of the derivative work right. Some
courts and commentators regard this approach against "free rides" as
160. Id. at 81.
161. Id.
162. See Goldstein, supra note 72, at 217; Nielander, supra note 116, at 11.
163. Hadfield, supra note 118, at 11; Nielander, supra note 116, at 8.
164. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53, 62 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5666, 5675.
165. Id. at 53, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666.
166. Id. at 62, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675.
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an application of the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, 161 which the
Supreme Court has determined has no place in copyright law. 168 The
"sweat of the brow" doctrine, also termed "industrious collection,"
stated that copyright protection could be provided to those who exert
hard work in compiling information. 169 However, copyright law only
protects original expression, not hard work. Thus, the "sweat of the
brow" doctrine is no longer a valid consideration for determining the
presence of copyright protection, as it has the potential to allow
protection of ideas for no other reason than the effort of the author.
170
The argument that allowing unauthorized exploitation of
another's work is inequitable has no relation to the "sweat of the
brow" doctrine. Though on its surface the argument appears to
promote protection of the author's effort in creating a work, the actual
basis for the argument is the natural rights theory of copyright
protection. Allowing others to profit through exploitation of an
author's work is a violation of the author's inherent right of control as
creator of the work. The "sweat of the brow" doctrine can also be
distinguished from the equity argument by looking at the context in
which the doctrine was rejected by the Supreme Court. In Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Company, the defendant
copied data from the plaintiffs telephone directory about telephone
subscribers that the plaintiff had collected and compiled. 17' The
plaintiff contended that, under the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, it
had a copyright interest in the data compilation due to the effort
required to collect it, regardless of any lack of originality.' 72 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that protecting a
compilation exhibiting no originality would impermissibly extend
copyright protection in the underlying facts or data. 73 However,
expanding the derivative work right under a theory of fairness to the
author is meant to provide further protection to works that are
already the subject of copyright. An author would not gain any
ownership interest in any facts or data; instead, an author would gain
extra incentive to create. Any protection of effort inferred from an
expansion of the derivative work right is no more than that already
167. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527; Black & Page, supra note 146, at 637.
168. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991).
169. Id. at 353-54.
170. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527; Black & Page, supra note 155, at 638.
171. 499 U.S. at 344.
172. Id. The "sweat of the brow" doctrine had been developed by federal circuit
courts. See, e.g., Leon v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Jeweler's
Circular Publ'g Co. v. Keystone Publ'g Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922).
173. Feist, 499 U.S. at 353.
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underlying the incentive theory of copyright protection. Thus, the
"sweat of the brow" doctrine is not implicated by the argument that
fairness considerations support an expansion of the derivative work
right to include works that rely on but do not physically incorporate
preexisting copyrighted material.
D. A Proposal to Expand the Derivative Work Right
As this note concluded earlier in the context of jump-and-skip
DVD filters, the derivative work right as it currently stands probably
does not allow copyright owners to control the preparation of
secondary works which rely on, but do not physically incorporate,
their preexisting copyrighted works. The problem with this outcome
is that the interests of the author are not adequately balanced with
the interests of society. Although the public does benefit from
allowing these unauthorized secondary uses, authors are generally left
in the cold. Creators of technology-based works such as the jump-and-
skip filters, which rely entirely on the copyrighted works of others for
their usefulness, are not required to gain permission or provide
compensation for these profit-making purposes. With new
technologies emerging at an almost frantic pace, there is no way to
predict to what extent these "free rides" may negatively affect an
author's market in his or her works. Rather than permit secondary
users the unbridled ability to exploit others' copyrighted works in
ways similar to jump-and-skip filter companies like ClearPlay,
authors and interested users should bargain for such uses. In order to
ensure such market transactions, Congress should expand the
derivative work right.
174
Congress can address the interests of authors, secondary users,
and the general public by amending the statutory definition of
"derivative work" to include works that completely rely on, but do not
174. Many courts have recognized that Congress is best-suited to confront the issues
created when technological innovations impact the market for copyrighted materials. Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430-31 (1984) ; Am. Geophysical
Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1994). The Register of Copyrights,
Marybeth Peters, stated her belief that Congress should examine and rethink the
derivative work right in light of new and potential technology in her statement during a
House of Representatives subcommittee hearing on the Family Movie Act. Hearing of the
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property Subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee, Subject: H.R. 4586, The Family Movie Act of 2004, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE,
June 17, 2004; Marybeth Peters, The Family Movie Act, Statement before the
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Committee
on the Judiciary (June 17, 2004), available at http://judiciary.house.govlegacy/
peters061704.pdf.
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physically incorporate, preexisting copyrighted works. Such an
amendment could take the following form:
The term "derivative work" includes a work that would have no functional or
aesthetic value but for its specific reliance on a preexisting copyrighted work, but
does not incorporate that specific preexisting work in a fixed form. 
175
The major benefit of this proposed amendment is that it
provides authors with greater control over the exploitation of their
copyrighted works without jeopardizing either current or potential
technologies. 176 This is accomplished by the use of the word "specific"
in relation to "reliance" and "preexisting works." Without the word
"specific," such existing devices as CD players and DVD players could
be construed as infringements of the derivative work right due to their
exclusive function of providing access to copyrighted works.
177
Instead, inclusion of the word ensures that only unauthorized
secondary works that are tailored to rely on one or more specific works
face liability for infringement of the derivative work right. Further,
using the term "specific" ensures that new technologies themselves
cannot be infringements, just the specific works that are created for
those technologies. For instance, in the context of the jump-and-skip
DVD filters, each movie-specific filter would be an infringement, but
the general jump-and-skip technology that implements those filters
would not be. Thus, the proposed amendment would not curtail
technological developments; it would only expand the derivative work
right require that creators of specific secondary uses for those
technologies bargain with copyright owners for permission to use
specific works.
Another benefit of the proposed amendment is that it
encourages negotiation and cooperation between copyright owners and
interested secondary users. More protection for owners will most
likely lead to the development of licensing relationships with
technology companies like ClearPlay and other users. With the
knowledge that there is a market for new uses for their works, and the
ability to have some say in how their works will be exploited,
175. This sentence can be added to the definition of "derivative work" appearing at
17 U.S.C. § 101 with no changes to the existing language.
176. In addition to the benefits of the proposed amendment discussed in the
following paragraphs, many unauthorized uses may still be permissible. Because this
language affects only the application of the derivative work right, the amendment does not
preclude a potential finding of fair use under § 107 for an unauthorized use which would
otherwise violate this new provision.
177. Although in reality copyright owners would not likely bring suit against
manufacturers of CD players and DVD players, these examples are provided to show the
necessity of including the qualifier "specific" to the proposed statutory amendment.
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copyright owners will probably be more open to negotiating licenses.
Any resulting licensing agreements would also benefit society in that
there will be greater access to information with less potential for
detrimental lawsuits.
In summary, the important policies and interests surrounding
copyright law as recognized by Congress, commentators, and recent
court decisions support expansion of the derivative work right to
protect authors from unauthorized secondary uses that rely on but do
not physically incorporate preexisting copyrighted works.
III. CONCLUSION
The continuous development of new technologies constantly
provides courts with a bevy of difficult and novel copyright issues. Try
as it might, Congress was not able to anticipate all potential legal
issues that would arise with the development of new technologies
when it enacted the Copyright Act of 1976.178 The issue of new
technology-based works which rely completely on preexisting
copyrighted material, but do not incorporate that material in a fixed
form, is one that the Copyright Act does not clearly address. Although
the legislative history of the Copyright Act states that fixation in a
secondary work of the preexisting elements of another work is not
necessarily required for a finding of infringement, judicial precedent
such as Galoob and Micro Star suggest otherwise.
Some courts and commentators, following a utilitarian
approach to justify copyright protection, do not see a strict fixation
requirement for infringement of the derivative work right as
problematic. However, the trend, both in legislation and even recent
court opinions, is to recognize that authors have a natural right over
their intellectual creations, and thus should have broad control over
the exploitation of those works. Further, various market
considerations support providing authors with more power to prevent
others from using their works for profit without permission. In
consideration of this recognition of natural rights, Congress should
amend the Copyright Act so that the derivative work right protects
authors from unauthorized uses that rely on but do not physically
incorporate their preexisting works.
178. Or, in the very least, it was not able to provide a clear enough statement of its
intent so as to prevent any judicial confusion in the application of the statute.
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This proposal recognizes the needs of all interested parties and
balances them to further the goal of copyright law to benefit the public
at large.
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